The two words, except ‘and,’ in the title of this paper are meant to bring to mind two different philosophical claims that, I believe, are intimately related. Both have occasioned much controversy. The relation between them, however, has not been widely recognized. The first claim is the contention that is often expressed by saying that ‘consciousness is always consciousness of something.’ The second claim is the assertion that mental things are distinguished from physical things by their being inherently private. I (...) believe that if intentionality is carefully understood, this understanding allows us to explain why, and in what sense, those mental things called ‘feelings’ are private. I am sufficiently aware of the dismal fate that has been visited on most, if not all, philosophical explanations. Consequently, I do not claim, without qualification, to explain mental privacy. My position is that if what I shall call ‘the thesis of intentionality,’ which differs in certain respects from that mentioned above, is true, then mental privacy can be explained. So, in this paper, I shall first discuss intentionality at some length; secondly, I shall present the consequent explanation of mental privacy. (shrink)

This year is being celebrated by a large number of our fellow-countrymen as the centenary of a movement, associated with the name of the University of Oxford, of which, although in its first stage it might easily be mistaken—and has often been mistaken—for a mere wave of theological and ecclesiastical reaction within the Established Church of England, the attentive historian of the nineteenth century must take account as in fact a very powerful influence in the religious and, no less really (...) though to a less degree, in the social and political life of the whole nation. Considerable, however, as is the importance which may justly be attributed in other respects to what is known as the Oxford Movement, the professed student of philosophy may be excused if he is chiefly struck by the apparent remoteness of its original leaders from the currents of speculative thought characteristic of the period in which it began its course. There were perhaps among them only two who can be named as contributors to philosophical literature in the technical sense now commonly borne by the term “philosophical”; and the contributions even of these two can scarcely be said to have taken their place among the works to which an ordinary teacher of philosophy would be likely to direct the attention of his pupils. To these two, however, John Henry Newman and William George Ward, I propose to devote here a few pages which may be found not without interest to readers of Philosophy. (shrink)

I Suppose that most believers in God, if asked what is the relation of God to the world, would reply that he is its Creator and its Lord. But, like all the language in which we express our religious convictions, the language of this reply is plainly metaphorical. It calls up the picture of a human artificer or artist, the image of a human ruler or proprietor. And yet it needs but little reflection to perceive that there must be essential (...) differences between a human artificer or artist, who has a material to work in ready to his hand, and One who makes all things, as it is said, “ out of nothing “; between a human ruler or proprietor. (shrink)

Just three years ago I contributed to this Journal a few remarks on the problem of the relation of “God” to “the World.” I propose in the present article to add some observations on the closely connected problem of the relation of “God” to “Man”; especially in view of the theory, by no means a new one, but at the moment much in evidence , that when we speak of God what we have really in mind is our own human (...) nature or some part or aspect of it, imaginatively objectified as a distinct or independent reality. (shrink)

In this paper I shall be concerned with Hegel’s reasoning in that kind of thinking which he called “dialectic,” and in particular with dialectic as it is exhibited in that work and part of a work which he entitled “Logic.” I shall be concerned with a single question about the dialectic in these writings, namely, “Can this dialectic be shown to involve a valid pattern of deductive reasoning?” The reason I have used the word “involve” in the preceding sentence needs (...) to be made explicit. The question I wish to deal with is not whether all of the thought processes, the whole string of “transitions” from one concept to another, which Hegel outlines as the dialectic of his logic, are formal deductions. I think they are not. I only wish to ask whether Hegel’s dialectical philosophizing in his Logic does, typically, involve any deductive move. I shall argue that the correct answer to this question is “Yes.”. (shrink)

In an interesting article on Kierkegaard and the “Existential” Philosophy, contributed to the number of Philosophy for July 1941, Miss Dorothy Emmet counselled her readers to make themselves acquainted with the Journals of the famous Danish thinker, now rendered accessible to Englishmen ignorant of his language by the translation of Mr. Dru. I have taken her advice and am grateful to her for it. I am not indeed convinced that this self-revelation of a remarkable personality can be ranked among the (...) great autobiographies of the world. It seems to me to fall, if only on account of its lack of unity as a work of literary art, below the standard which such an estimate of it would imply. But it is undoubtedly both impressive in itself and important in view of the influence which its author, little known in his lifetime beyond a circle of the parochial narrowness of which he was painfully conscious, has come, long after his death, to exert upon the spiritual and intellectual life of Europe to-day. The present article, however, will not be concerned with the exposition or criticism of this or other writings of Kierkegaard, but with thoughts, more or less suggested by my reading of him, respecting the notion of God and its significance for philosophy. (shrink)

In the first part of this article I propose to describe two strongly contrasted situations in the world of thought, one of fifty years ago and the other of to-day. In the second I shall submit to my readers some reflections suggested by the contrast between the two.

Webb has articulated a clear, multi-dimensional framework for discussing simulation models and modelling strategies. This framework will likely co-evolve with modelling. As such, it will be important to continue to clarify these dimensions and perhaps add to them. I discuss the dimension of generality and suggest that a dimension of integrativeness may also be needed.